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Abstract
Recent evidence has established that non-cognitive skills are key determinants of education
and labor outcomes, and are malleable throughout adolescence. However, little is known
about the mechanisms producing these results. This paper tests a channel that could
explain part of the association between non-cognitive skills and important outcomes:
teacher grading discrimination toward student behaviors. Evidence is drawn from a unique
data pertaining to students from middle and high-school in Brazilian private schools. Our
empirical strategy is based on the contrasting of school-level tests graded by teachers
and school-level tests that cover the same content but are graded blindly. Using detailed
data on student classroom behaviors and holding constant performance in exams graded
blindly, evidence indicates that teachers inflate the grades of better-behaved students
while deducting points from worse-behaved ones. These biases are driven by grading
discrimination in exams with open questions. Additionally, teachers’ behavior does not
appear to be consistent with statistical discrimination.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have emphasized that socially productive skills include not only traditionally studied
cognitive abilities, but also behavioral and socio-emotional factors such as perseverance, self-
control, academic behaviors, and prosociality. In recent years, numerous studies have documented
the central role played by these noncognitive skills in shaping educational attainment and adult
outcomes (Segal, 2013; Heckman et al., 2006; Papageorge et al., 2019; Deming, 2017; Kautz and
Zanoni, 2014).1 Importantly from a policy standpoint, there is also ample evidence suggesting
that these skills are malleable, and can be influenced by school and teacher quality, home
environment, and educational interventions (Jackson, 2018; Bertrand and Pan, 2013; Heckman
et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2020; Alan et al., 2019). However, despite the importance of
non-cognitive skills, and significant advances in understanding its causes and consequences,
there is still limited empirical evidence on how they affect important outcomes.
In the present study, we propose grading discrimination as a potential mediator for gaps
in attainment between students with different non-cognitive skills.2 We examine its prevalence
by testing whether classroom behaviors affect teacher grading.3 The paper employs a unique
administrative data from an educational company that manages more than one hundred private
schools in Brazil. We use teachers’ reports on their students’ behavior to construct measures
of good and bad in-class behaviors. Our empirical strategy is based on the contrasting of
teacher-assigned and blindly-assigned scores from school-level tests that cover the same content.
To deal with the incidence of measurement error on the blind test scores used as regressors,
we use lagged scores as an instrument for the current ones. We show that if the exogeneity
condition of the instrument does not hold, our discrimination parameters of interest are bounded
by OLS and IV estimators under a few additional assumptions. We find evidence that teachers
discriminate students with good behavior positively and discriminate students with bad behavior
negatively. Between 20 and 30 per cent of the correlation between behaviors and teacher-assigned
math scores seem to be explained by grading biases. We also find similar results for Portuguese
and essay.
Our results are largely driven by grading discrimination in written exams, where teachers
may exert discretion by assign partial credits for each question. Using blindly-assigned essay
scores, we find no evidence supporting that our results are explained by potential biases from
1For surveys, see Almlund et al. (2011), Farrington et al. (2012), Heckman and Kautz (2012), and Heckman
et al. (2019).
2By discrimination, we mean the unequal assessment of students on the basis of their in-class behaviors
rather than their performance in examinations. On the one hand, teachers may statistically discriminate pupil
grades by using in-class behaviors to evaluate the unobserved student scholastic aptitude, especially if signals of
scholastic aptitude are hard to measure (Arrow, 1972; Phelps, 1972). On the other hand, teachers may have
particular tastes for pupils with specific classroom behaviors, and this could also lie behind any grading bias
towards student behavior (Becker, 2010).
3As previous papers, we proxy for students’ non-cognitive skill using academic behaviors. Some studies have
used classroom behaviors based on teacher reports like we do (Segal, 2013; Papageorge et al., 2019; Heckman
et al., 2013). Other studies have used grades, disciplinary infractions, absences, and grade progression (Jackson,
2018; Kautz and Zanoni, 2014). Academic behaviors have also been associated with traditional non-cognitive
skills such as patience (Alan and Ertac, 2018; Castillo et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2013), self-control (Duckworth
and Seligman, 2005), and conscientiousness (Segal, 2008). See Heckman et al. (2019) for further discussion.
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math teachers toward student writing skills. Additionally, teachers’ grading behavior does
not appear to be consistent with statistical discrimination. First, grading biases are constant
throughout the year, which is not compatible with a learning model of statistical discrimination.
Second, limiting the sample to classrooms where badly-behaved students are as skilled as
the well-behaved ones leaves the results unchanged. Overall, this paper shows that grading
discrimination toward classroom behaviors does exist and mediates a significant share of the
association between these non-cognitive skills and test scores. As suggested by Farrington et al.
(2012), other non-cognitive factors affect performance through academic behaviors. Therefore,
our results may be capturing discrimination toward a larger set of non-cognitive skills. What is
more, as grading manipulation can have several consequences,4 our results may also indicate
that inaccurate grades can explain part of the relation between non-cognitive skills and other
important life outcomes.
Our findings contribute to the literature highlighting the importance of non-cognitive skills.
As already mentioned, little is known about the mechanisms behind the association between
non-cognitive skills and educational and labor outcomes. Researches often speculate that
non-cognitive skills produce good study habits which result in better life outcomes.5 Evidence
on that channel is mixed, depending on the skill being evaluated. While Lavecchia et al. (2016)
show that impatient students report spending less time doing homework, other papers find that
impatient students do not have lower study effort, even though they have much worse test scores.
(De Paola and Gioia, 2017; Non and Tempelaar, 2016). Outside the economics literature, a few
papers show that personality traits are correlated with study habits (Lubbers et al., 2010; Crede´
and Kuncel, 2008). A related explanation is that non-cognitive skills may affect the effort put
during tasks to obtain good results. Evidence by Borghans et al. (2008) support this explanation.
The authors show that individuals with high non-cognitive skills operate a low-stakes cognitive
test at a high level, even without rewards (see Segal (2012) for a related result). Similarly,
Cubel et al. (2016) show that personality traits predict performance in an experimental task
that requires real effort. The authors argue that this finding suggests that at least part of the
effect of personality on labor market outcomes operates through productivity. Overall, the few
papers proposing mediators for the association between non-cognitive skills and schooling and
labor market outcomes use small samples, analyze experimental outcomes, and are based on
partial correlations. In our study, we analyze a significant number of students and make use
of a quasi-experimental research design to estimate a different mechanism – discrimination in
4Recent papers show that grading biases have far-reaching consequences for the students, affecting their
future performance in test scores, high-school graduation rates, college initiation rates, chosen field of education,
and earnings (Lavy and Sand, 2018; Terrier, 2016; Dee et al., 2019; Nordin et al., 2019; Diamond and Persson,
2016).
5Segal (2013) theorizes a similar channel. Her empirical results provide evidence that childhood misbehavior
is negatively correlated with educational attainment and labor market outcomes. Based on the results of Castillo
et al. (2011) – which find that pupils with higher discount rates have more behavioral problems in school – she
develops a model to interpret the mechanisms driving her results. In her model, individuals are endowed with
both cognitive and non-cognitive human capital. They can enhance their cognitive human capital at each level
of schooling by exerting costly effort. Those who value the future less (i.e., those with low non-cognitive skills)
invest less effort in school and hence accumulate less cognitive human capital; as a result, they earn less.
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grading – behind the relation between non-cognitive skills and an educational outcome. In
particular, we evaluate performance in school-level exams, which is a non-experimental outcome
that can have several consequences for the future of students.
This paper is closely related to the recent literature on teacher discrimination in grading.
Some previous papers compare non-blindly graded exams and blindly graded exams across
minority and non-minority students (Botelho et al., 2015; Burgess and Greaves, 2013; Hanna and
Linden, 2012) and genders (Lavy, 2008; Hinnerich et al., 2011; Falch and Naper, 2013; Cornwell
et al., 2013; Breda and Ly, 2015), and establish that grading discrimination exists in those
dimensions. Besides ethnic and gender indicators, classroom behavior is another relevant student
characteristic available to teachers during in-class interactions that may impact their judgment
when grading.6 We contribute to the literature by testing this hypothesis in detail, using a unique
dataset containing information on objective indicators of student in-class behaviors. Previous
papers recognize that classroom behavior may be one of the most critical cofounders in grading
discrimination estimates. Hence, a few of them try to adjust for proxies of behavior.7 Similar to
those papers, we also find grading discrimination toward ethnicity and gender. However, in our
setting, there is a small correlation between these characteristics and more objective measures
of in-class behaviors. In this scenario, we were able to estimate discrimination effects toward
behaviors, without ethnicity and gender being relevant confounders.
Despite being one of the first studies to examine grading biases toward pupil behaviors in
detail, we are well aware that the question of whether teachers factor the behavior of students into
grades is not new to the education and psychology literature. Researchers working with classroom
assessments have been warning about the unreliability of grades and its consequences for a
long time (e.g., Starch and Elliott (1912)). There is widespread agreement among measurement
specialists that grades should be based exclusively on measures of current achievement. Still,
grading practice studies show that a significant share of teachers report that their grades
also reflect non-achievement factors such as behavior (McMillan, 2001; McMillan et al., 2002;
McMillan, 2003; Frary et al., 1993; Cizek et al., 1995).8 As far as we know, quantitative
researchers within the education literature have not studied grading biases toward student
behaviors. Similar to the economics literature, most of them focus on issues related to gender
and race (Wen, 1979; Piche´ et al., 1977; Roen, 1992). We contribute by presenting such a
quantitative analysis. Additionally, as we explore mechanisms behind the teachers’ grading
6Mechtenberg (2009) refers to the behaviors as attitudes, which include habits, styles, and personality traits
of the students that teachers may like/dislike.
7Lavy (2008) adjusts for past grades under the hypothesis that those should be correlated with students’ past
behavior in the classroom, which should be correlated with the students’ current behavior. Botelho et al. (2015)
also use previous grades as well as several other variables. Among them, physical education grades, attendance
records, and the perception of parents regarding their children’s engagement at school. Cornwell et al. (2013)
controls for “attitudes toward learning”, which are based on teacher reports. Alesina et al. (2018) use a subjective
behavioral grade decided jointly by all the teachers. Terrier (2016) uses a variable of disruptive behavior that
equals one if the student received a disciplinary warning from the class council or if he/she was temporarily
excluded from the school by the school head because of violent behavior.
8Looking for remedies for the mixed signal sent by grades, specialists proposed a reform known as standards-
based grading, which has been gaining momentum in U.S. schools for the past 20 years (see McMillan (2013)
and references therein).
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behavior, our results also contribute to researchers designing and evaluating technologies to
reduce grading biases (e.g., Jae and Cowling (2009)).
Research in psychology has studied the effects of non-cognitive skills on test scores
extensively. Several studies from the seventies and eighties show that student temperament in
the classroom strongly predicts teacher-assigned grades. In a survey of these papers, Keogh
(1986) concludes that teacher perceptions of student temperament in the classroom may influence
their evaluations of pupil performance.9 Similarly, new researches in psychology have evaluated
the predictive power of student personality skills on grades and standardized achievement
test (SAT) scores (for surveys, see Almlund et al. (2011) and Duckworth and Allred (2012)).
An important finding from this literature is that, among the Big Five, conscientiousness –
traditionally associated with student classroom behaviors – is the most predictive skill of both
course grades and SAT scores. However, a few papers show that some facets of conscientiousness
seem to be better predictors of course grades than of achievement scores. Following our previous
discussion, researchers argue that this may be the result of those abilities inducing more positive
study habits, which translate into higher course grades. As achievement tests require the
students to solve relatively novel problems, its scores may not reflect study habits as much as
test scores.10 It is also speculated that some skills may help students to behave positively in the
classroom, which could be directly factored into report card grades by teachers. Our study adds
to the literature by providing evidence of this channel using an appropriate design. But, instead
of evaluating SAT scores, we use blindly-assigned scores from school-level examinations that are
high-stakes, and contrast them with teacher-assigned grades from examinations that cover the
same content of the blind ones. In our setting, studying habits should impact both types of
tests similarly.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and presents our behavior
measures. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy. The main results are presented at Section 4.
Section 5 presents robustness analyses. Section 6 studies statistical discrimination as a potential
mechanism behind our results. Section 7 concludes.
9She interprets the results through the “Goodness of Fit” model, proposed by Thomas and Chess (1977).
Their model describes how children whose attributes meet or exceed contextual presses (e.g. the demands or
expectations of teachers) evoke stimulation from the context which more readily promotes adaptive functioning
than is the case with the stimulation evoked by children whose characteristics did not fit the demands of their
contexts. This concept can be applied in many concepts, but concerning student classroom behaviors it has been
developed by Lerner and his colleagues (see, e.g., Lerner et al. (1985)). The general idea is that teachers expect
from their students behavioral traits that they believe are consistent with the school environment. Students who
come closest to the “optimum” demand evoke the most positive responses from teachers. As a result, classroom
behaviors (as well as other types of socio-emotional skills) have consequences for achievement and perhaps
especially for teachers’ evaluations.
10Related to this channel, Borghans et al. (2016) find that IQ is a better predictor of SAT scores than of
course grades.
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2 Data
2.1 Background and Data
We employ administrative data from a Brazilian private education company. The company
manages more than one hundred private schools located in the South, Southeast, and Center-
West of Brazil. Enrollment corresponded to more than eighty thousand primary, middle,
and high-school pupils in 2018. To examine teacher assessment biases, we take advantage of
administrative dataset that contains students’ scores on tests graded blindly and non-blindly.
Schools operate a two-term school year (first and second semester). Each term is divided
into three cycles. Students perform, per each cycle, a test graded blindly and another graded by
their teachers. Both types of tests are high-stakes and do factor into the pupils’ end-of-term
average score. Teacher-assessed grades are worth 50%, while the blind scores are worth 40%.
Students also receive a subjective behavioral grade from each teacher, which factors 10% into
the end-of-term average score.
Each subject has a specific teacher-graded examination. Most of the exams rely heavily
on questions that require written answers. The exceptions are the third exams from the first
and second semesters, which are only multiple-choice. When correcting open items, teachers
have considerable arbitrariness to assign grades, mainly because of partial scores. Since teachers
have permanent contact with the pupils they teach, these grades could potentially be biased
by teacher stereotypes. Students from middle and high-school obtain the blind scores when
they complete exams that test knowledge on four topics: mathematics, language (English and
Portuguese), science (physics, biology, and chemistry), and humanities (geography, history,
sociology and philosophy). All the questions from the blind exams are multiple-choice and
corrected by a machine. Hence, the blind scores can be assumed to be free of any bias caused
by stereotypes from examiners. Additionally, in most of the schools, students perform essays
that are graded blindly by an external team. However, these essays are high-stakes for only a
small sample of schools.
Both the blind and the non-blind examinations are created by the schools’ pedagogical
team, based on a bank of questions. For each cycle, they are designed to measure the same
content. Both tests are also taken under the same conditions: they take place in the students’
classroom and are supervised by inspectors, which are also responsible for giving general
instructions. The non-blind exam is scheduled usually 5 to 30 days after the blind exams.
However, neither teachers nor students know the current blind score before the non-blind test.
The major difference between the tests is that the blind exams usually cover different subjects,
while the non-blind exam is specific to each subject. The exceptions are math and essay. We
focus mostly on math scores as most of the blindly-graded essays are not high-stakes.11
Besides evaluating student behaviors using subjective grades, teachers can report their
11We also test for teacher biases in the Portuguese and essay non-blind scores. We do not test for teacher
biases in the other subjects since the blind examinations of humanities and science cover very different subjects.
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pupils’ classroom behavior at any specific class using a platform developed for this purpose,
available in the schools’ online system. Teachers must mark at least one of the following options
when assessing their students’ behavior: “dedication”, “good interaction with classmates”,
“participation during the class”, “excessive talking”, “cellphone use”, “disinterest during the
class”, or “did not complete the required tasks”. All teachers are informed that they should use
the platform regularly, although no sanctions are imposed on those who do not.
The dataset used in this study pertains to the school year 2018 and contains all the blind
and non-blind scores of the students from middle school (grades 6-9) and the first two years of
high-school (grades 10-11).12 We select these students as before grade 6, pupils do not perform
blindly-grade exams. Also, in the last year of high-school (grade 12), students do not perform
teacher-assigned scores. Our working dataset is obtained after imposing restriction on the
availability for each student of at least 4 (out of 6) blind and non-blind test scores. We also have
access to the dataset coming from the schools’ online system, which contains all the behavior
assessments teachers made in 2018. We discuss next how we use these reports to construct
behavior measures. Finally, our data also contain two major student characteristics: ethnicity
and gender.
2.2 Behavior Measures
In order to estimate both a potential discrimination against badly behaved students, as well as
a potential favoritism toward the best behaved ones, we propose and compute two behavior
measures. To do so, we start classifying the behavior reports into good and bad assessments.
In particular, “dedication”, “good interaction with classmates”, and “participation during the
class” are classified as an assessment of good behavior. Now, “excessive talking”, “cellphone
use”, “disinterest during the class”, and “did not complete the required tasks” are classified as
an assessment of bad behavior.
Based on this classification, we construct measures of good and bad classroom behavior
defined on the interval [0, 1] for each student and each subject. The measure of good (bad)
behavior weights the number of good (bad) assessments a student received from his/her teacher
of a specific subject by the maximum number of good (bad) evaluations received by a classmate
from that same teacher. These measures are formally defined as follows. Let I denote the set
of all students. For any i ∈ I, define C(i) ⊂ I as the set of students in the same classroom of
pupil i, including himself/herself. Let bis and gis denote the number of bad and good behavior
reports received by i from a subject s teacher. The good and the bad behavior measures are
defined, respectively, as:
GBis :=
gis
max{gjs : j ∈ C(i)}
,
12In Brazil, children enter the first grade the year they turn six. So, our sample is composed mainly of students
between 11 and 16 years old.
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and
BBis :=
bis
max{bjs : j ∈ C(i)}
.
Notice that the good (bad) behavior measure from subject s is not defined for pupils in
classrooms where gis = 0 (bis = 0) for all i ∈ C(i). These classrooms are discarded from our final
sample. However, the GB (BB) measure is well defined for pupils with no good (bad) behavior
assessments in a specific subject provided they belong to classrooms where at least one of their
classmates received such an assessment. In that case, GBis = 0 (BBis = 0). These students
can be understood as “neutral” with respect to the respective behavior measure. To reduce the
number of missings and neutral students we also use measures that are not a function of teacher
s. These are based on the behavior assessments made by all the teachers. In robustness checks,
we will also test alternative ways of using the behavior reports.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our sample. The data cover 14,777 students from
grades 6-11 in 513 classrooms and 57 schools. At least 63% of the sample is white, 17% is Pardo,
3% is black, and 0.6% is yellow or indigenous. A large share of parents (16%) did not provide
their children’s ethnicity. The gender split is roughly even. In 94% of the classrooms, there are
students with at least one behavior assessment. This share is lower if we consider only reports
made by math teachers: 72%. Figure 1 plots the empirical CDF of the behavior measures for
both cases. The measures computed using only the assessments from math teachers – panels (a)
and (b) – assume value zero for a large share of students (35%− 40%). The share of neutral
students reduces to 8%− 20% if we consider the behavior assessments from all the teachers –
panels (c) and (d). In both cases students receive more good than bad behavior assessments.
As reported in Table 1 students received, on average, 16 assessments of good behavior and 9 of
bad behavior. Of these, 4 and 3 comes from math teachers, respectively.
Figure 2 displays the performance gap in teacher-assigned scores – converted into z-scores –
between students with different behavior skills. In order to compare different grade distributions
according to the student behaviors, we created binary variables that indicate whether students
are in the top quartile of the bad and good behavior measures’ distribution – BB(Pct.75)
and GB(Pct.75), respectively. Students with BB(Pct.75) = 0 and GB(Pct.75) = 1 strongly
outperform those with BB(Pct.75) = 1 and GB(Pct.75) = 0, respectively. Our goal from here
consists in estimating whether part of this association can be explained by grading discrimination.
As will be furthered discussed, we will use the blind scores as the counterfactual grades that
students would receive if there were no grading discrimination. Figure 3 plots the blind and
non-blind math scores after we took their average across the six examinations to reduce the
effect of test scores measurement error. We can see visually that both grades are extremely
correlated. This is confirmed after we fit the data points with a linear regression model and
obtain an estimated slope of 0.81 and an R-squared of 59%.13 This descriptive evidence supports
13When we pool the six examinations and correct test score measurement error using past scores as instrument
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our research design that relies on the similarity between the blind and non-blind exams.
3 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in estimating a parameter of grading discrimination toward classroom behaviors,
defined as the effect of in-class behaviors on test scores, conditional on the student proficiency in
the subject and other characteristics that teachers may be biased at. To motivate our estimable
equation, we assume a simple and intuitive statistical model for how test scores are defined. The
non-blind scores of student i in exam j and subject s are determined by the following function:
SNBijs = Pijs + vijs +∆(Wijs),
where Pijs is student’s proficiency. This component reflects factors such as i
′s knowledge in
the subject s required by the exam j and his/her test-taking ability. The term vijs represents
idiosyncratic factors, such as luck or how the student was feeling on a particular day, that are
equal to zero in expectation. The term ∆(Wijs) represents potential bias by exam graders, who
manipulate test scores based on student i’s characteristics contained in Wijs. In particular, we
let
∆(Wijs) = β
′Bis + φ
′Xij + ξijs,
where Bis := (GBis, BBis) is a vector of student i’s classroom behavior in subject s–; Xij
includes ethnicity indicators (Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow, and White), gender, and the
past performance of student i in blind examinations;14 and ξijs include i’s characteristics
unobserved by the econometrician that teachers observe and may discriminate against.
We refer to Pijs as the test score that i would receive in expectation if there was no grading
bias. However, we only observe a noisy signal from it, coming from scores in examinations that
cover the same content of SNBijs , take place under very similar conditions, but are graded blindly
(SBijs), and, hence, are free of any kind of bias from the graders. We assume that
SBijs = Pijs + eijs,
where the error term eijs may not be necessarily idiosyncratic. As S
B
ijs could potentially measure
different skills, we can decompose
eijs = P˜ijs − Pijs + uijs,
where P˜ijs is the i’s proficiency required in the blindly-graded examinations and uijs is an
idiosyncratic noisy. To make explicit that potential biases could arise if both types of examination
for the current scores, we obtain an even higher slope.
14In our main specifications we adjust for the cumulative average performance in the blind examinations from
science, humanities, and languages. When not using IV, we also adjust for past performance in math.
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were to measure different abilities, we assume a simple relation between Pijs and P˜ijs:
Pijs = δP˜ijs + rijs,
where rijs include factors that are required only by the non-blind examinations.
In a final step, as we pool the test scores from different examinations and classrooms, we
add to our main specification classroom fixed effects (αc) and exam fixed effects (πj). Using
previous definitions, we get that:
SNBijs = δS
B
ijs + β
′Bis + φ
′Xij + αc + πj + εijs, (1)
where εijs := ξijs + rijs − δuijs + vijs. Our parameter of interest is the vector β. It measures
the effects of classroom behaviors on teacher-assigned test-scores, conditional on student’s
proficiency (proxied by SBijs), other characteristics that teachers may be biased at (Xij), and
exploring only within classroom variation (αc). Its identification requires that we deal with
unobserved heterogeneity (ξijs + rijs) and measurement error in the blind scores (uijs).
Regarding unobserved heterogeneity, we claim that, conditional on ethnicity, gender,
and past blind scores, if there are competencies not captured by the blind scores, varying
systematically within the classroom, they are balanced between students with different in-class
behaviors. In particular, we are adjusting for the characteristics the literature has shown teachers
may be biased against. As will be shown main point estimates are stable in specifications with
and without controls, which may suggest that omitted variable bias is not a major concern
if selection on observables is informative about selection on unobservables (e.g., Altonji et al.
(2005); Oster (2019)). Moreover, we advocate that V(rijs) ≈ 0. We already discussed some
particularities of our design that may provide grounds for the plausibility of the assumption.
Overall, we believe there are no apparent systematic differences in the exam-taking environment
that could interact with i’s characteristics. Both the blindly and the non-blindly graded exams
are school-level tests that take place in the regular classes and are supervised by inspectors.
Furthermore, both types of exams are high-stakes and designed by the pedagogical sector to
cover the same content, based on a bank of questions. Our main concern is that, while the blind
exams are only multiple-choice, most of the non-blind exams require written answers. If these
questions require abilities not covered by the blind exams, correlated with in-class behaviors, our
identification strategy could not be valid. To investigate whether this seems to be a potential
concern we make use of a reduced sample of schools where students perform blindly-graded
essays. First, we use the scores from these essays as proxies for student writing skills and show
that controlling for it leaves the results unchanged. Second, we show that, in this subsample,
essay teachers practice grading discrimination. In this case, we are able to present evidence of
biases toward behaviors in a setting where both the blind and the non-blind exams have the
same format.
To tackle the measurement error problem, we use the lagged blind math score (LSBijs) as
an instrument for the current one, under the commonly made assumption that measurement
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errors are not serially correlated (e.g., Bond and Lang (2018)).15 Within the discrimination
in grading literature, this is the same strategy of Botelho et al. (2015).16 In the context of
Value-Added Models, simulations in Lockwood and McCaffrey (2014) suggest that using lagged
scores as instruments for the current ones can eliminate the bias in treatment effects estimations
originated from measurement error in test scores used as regressors.17 Another important finding
by the authors is that controlling for multiple prior test scores can mitigate the influence of test
measurement error. For that reason, especially when we estimate (1) by OLS, Xij include past
cumulative performance in all other subjects: language, science, and humanities. One might still
be worried about the validity of the exclusion restriction. It might be, for example, that teachers
practice statistical discrimination by using students’ past performance in blind math exams to
reduce noisy about their proficiency. The exclusion restriction may be valid provided we adjust
especially for past test scores in other subjects, but also for pupil’s ethnicity, gender, classroom
behavior, and classroom fixed effects. Otherwise, it is likely that lagged blind scores would be
correlated positively with the unobserved skills that determine SNBijs . Under this scenario, we
show in Appendix A that OLS and IV produce upper and lower bounds for β. Due to test
scores measurement error, the bias of the OLS estimator of β is bounded away from zero. The
intuition is that behaviors measure part of δ through the correlation between behaviors and SBijs
once δ is estimated with attenuation bias. Contrary, if C(LSBijs, εijs) > 0, δ is overestimated by
IV, and hence, β is estimated with attenuation bias.18 Anyway, we believe the non-validity of
the exclusion restriction is not a major concern. We obtain nearly identical results when using
more distant lags as instrument. What is more, when we use more than one lag as instrument,
we perform over-identification tests, which provide evidence that all instruments are valid. Also,
when we estimate β by OLS and consider additional proxies for Pijs, we obtain upper bounds
that are very close to the IV estimates. Finally, if we impose the restriction δ = 1 (so that we
do not need to deal with the measurement error problem) we obtain very similar results.
Regarding inference, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and calculated with
student-level clusters. We also tested for school-level clusters and the standard errors remained
15In a study of racial gaps in test scores over time, the authors present evidence suggesting that serial
correlation of measurement errors is unlikely to be a significant problem in their data.
16In a study of gender discrimination in grading, Terrier (2016) estimates an equation similar to (1), in
an additional analysis of her paper. She corrects the test score measurement error using quarter of birth as
instrument for the blind scores. A few papers from the literature also use a similar specification to (1) but do
correct for the measurement error problem (Cornwell et al., 2013; Alesina et al., 2018). Other studies – most
studying gender discrimination – use a difference-in-differences (DID) specification (e.g., Falch and Naper (2013)
and Lavy (2008)). Our results are very similar when we follow this strategy. The DID specification can be
motivated in our setting when we set δ = 1. In fact, the IV estimation of δ is not far from one.
17A drawback is that the IV estimation can lead to imprecise estimates. The authors propose several alternative
methods based on the standard error of the test score – returned by Item Response Theory (IRT) – to correct for
the measurement error bias. As the school examinations we study are not constructed using IRT, we can not use
these methods. However, other papers that also use lagged scores as instrument to correct for the measurement
error report that doing so using the standard errors returned by IRT leads to very similar results (Khwaja et al.,
2011; Botelho et al., 2015).
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C(LSBijs, εijs) > 0 if the lagged blind scores are correlated positively with the unobserved skills that
determines SBijs – C(LS
NB
ijs , ξijs + rijs) > 0 – and the measurement errors are not auto-correlated or the serial
correlation is lower in comparison to C(LSNBijs , ξijs + rijs).
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nearly identical.19 Additionally, in all our specifications, the test scores are standardized to a
distribution with zero mean and a unit standard deviation. This procedure is applied within
subjects to each test separately. To facilitate reading of results, in our main specifications Bis
stands for binary variables that indicate whether students are in the top quartile of the behavior
measures’ distribution. We also present the results using continuous behavior measures. To deal
with a possible simultaneity concern, we compute behavior measures that uses only reports that
precede the teacher-graded examinations. Alternatively, we estimate the biases in the non-blind
scores from the second semester, using only the behavior reports from the first semester.
4 Main Results
We begin by examining the association between behaviors and test scores. Table 2, column (1),
presents the unconditional OLS estimates. We can see that the average math grades of students
with bad in-class behaviors (BB(Pct.75) = 1) are 0.26 standard deviation (SD) below those
with BB(Pct.75) = 0. The unconditional grade gap between students with GB(Pct.75) = 1
and GB(Pct.75) = 0 is even greater: 0.51 SD in favor of the better-behaved pupils. As several
other non-cognitive skills studied by the literature, our behavior measures strongly predict
pupil test scores. Of course, this does not imply directly that teachers are practicing grading
discrimination. If, for example, students with better in-class behavior are those who prepare
more for the tests, we should expect them to obtain higher grades.
Therefore, in column (2), we follow the strategy outlined in Section 3. We control for the
blind math scores, our proxy for the grades that students would obtain if there were no grading
bias. To tackle the measurement error problem we instrument current blind scores with its
lagged values.20 Under this specification, the behavior effects are significantly reduced, indicating
that a share of the competence differences seen by teachers is captured by performance in the
blindly-scored tests. This may be explained by a greater acquisition of cognitive skills – captured
by blind scores – among the students with higher non-cognitive skills – captured by classroom
behaviors. Still, the behavior effects are significant and high in magnitude, indicating that
teachers discriminate student behaviors in grading. Our results suggest that the better-behaved
students have their grades inflated by 0.11 SD. This amounts to 22% percent of the unconditional
gap. Additionally, teachers seem to deduct, on average, 0.08 SD from worse behaved students,
which represents 30% percent of the unconditional gap. As grading manipulation may have
several consequences for the future of students, these results suggest an important channel
whereby non-cognitive skills affect important life outcomes.
Our results remain virtually the same if we control for ethnicity and gender (column
(3)). We are relieved that despite the vast literature showing grading biases toward these
characteristics, they are not relevant cofounders in our setting. In the Appendix Section C.1
19Appendix Table B1 presents this result.
20Reflecting the cumulative nature of student performance, past scores are strongly correlated with current
ones as it is suggested by the high first-stage F statistic. Additional first-stage summary statistics are available
upon request.
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we present evidence suggesting discrimination against boys and black students, in line with
evidence from the literature. Results are, though, much weaker than the results we found for
behavior. In column (4), we control for past scores in other subjects, which may proxy for
unobservable competences required only by the non-blind exams. The point estimates remain
very similar. Finally, in column (5), we follow the same specification of Botelho et al. (2015),
which also correct for the measurement error in language test scores, and consider higher-order
polynomials for the blind scores.21 In particular, a cubic polynomial for the blind math scores,
a linear function of the blind language scores, and the interaction between these. Our results
remain nearly identical under this more flexible specification. We also analyze the different
behaviors separately. Disinterest during class and dedication seem to be the most discriminated
behaviors (Appendix Section C.2 discusses these results). Finally, in Appendix Section C.3, we
repeat the same exercise made here, but looking at the non-blind Portuguese scores. Results
found for this subject are similar to those found for math.
Table 3 presents the results when we tackle the measurement error problem using additional
lags of the blind math scores as instrument. The results remain very similar when, instead
of using the first lag, we use the second or the third lags (columns (2) and (3)). This gives
some support that auto-correlation of measurement errors is not an issue. Otherwise, we should
expect some variation in our estimates due to differential correlations between more distant
measurement errors and the current ones. In column (4), we use both the first and the second
lag as instrument. In column (5), we use all the first three lags. Point estimates do not change
under these specifications. What is more, when using additional lags as instrument, we perform
overidentification tests. The results from the tests suggest that we have no obvious reason to
distrust the validity of the set of instruments employed.
As previously discussed, if serial correlation of the measurement errors is not a major
concern, the non-validity of the exclusion restriction would probably leads us to underestimate
the behavior effects. We then estimate equation (1) by OLS to obtain upper bounds for the
true discrimination parameter of interest β. Table 4 presents the results. In column (1), we
replicate the same specification from Table 2, column (2). The first thing to notice is that the
relation between blind and non-blind scores estimated by OLS (0.42) is much lower than the
estimated by IV (0.97), reflecting the attenuation bias due to test score measurement error. As
a consequence, the behavior effects are higher when estimated by OLS. Another major difference
is that the inclusion of past scores in column (3) changes significantly the magnitude of our
estimates. The reason is that the past blind scores from other subjects serve as proxies for part
of the student proficiency signal, which mitigates the biases from the estimated behavior effects.
This allows us to estimate finer upper bounds for our parameter of interest. We also tried to
reduce the biases even more by using past math scores as control, instead of instrument, but the
results remained virtually the same (column (4)). Overall, we highlight that the upper bounds
estimated by OLS using additional proxies for student proficiency (−0.10 and 0.17 for the BB
21Instrumenting language scores may be especially important if one believes that language skills are required
only by the non-blind math scores.
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and GB measures, respectively) are close to the IV estimates (−0.07 and 0.11, respectively),
and hence underestimation of β does not seem to be a concern. Appendix Table B2 presents
the results when we also estimate equation (1) by OLS, but restrict δ to 1. In this case, our
dependent variable becomes the difference between blind and non-blind scores. Results are
nearly identical those we obtain using IV.
Taken together, our results confirm that grading discrimination toward behaviors does exist
in our sample and explain a significant share of the association between these non-cognitive skills
and test scores. As already discussed, this may explain part of the effects of non-cognitive skills
on education attainment and labor market outcomes. We also provided compelling evidence
on the validity of our IV strategy to deal with test measurement errors. In the next sections,
we present further robustness checks and study potential channels behind teachers’ grading
behavior.
5 Robustness
In this section, we conduct additional specification checks and explore data heterogeneity to
assess empirically the validity of potential threats to the internal validity of our study.
5.1 Written vs. multiple-choice exams
We start testing whether the difference in exam format – where most of the non-blind tests
require written answers and the blind ones are based on multiple-choice questions – poses a
threat to the internal validity of our study. We start showing that our results are driven by
grading discrimination in written exams, where teachers can exert discretion by assigning partial
scores. Appendix Table B3 presents the results. We find evidence that students with bad
in-class behaviors do not receive grade deductions in multiple-choice examinations. Indeed,
the negative correlation of 0.18 points between bad behavior and math grades (column (1))
vanishes when we adjust for student proficiency.22 Our findings also suggest that students
with better classroom behavior still receive grade credits in objective tests (0.06, s.e 0.02),
though in a much lower magnitude compared to exams that require written answers. In these
exams, we find that teachers deduct, on average, 0.13 SD of the worse-behaved students and
inflate the average grades of the well-behaved ones by 0.14 SD. These findings highlight an
important mechanism on how teachers practice grading discrimination. The results are in line
with evidence by Hanna and Linden (2012), which find that, in their experiment, graders made
an effort to assign students partial credit. Differently from our study, though, they did not
observe teachers grading exams that are only multiple-choice.
Biases are expected to be lower in exams that are only multiple-choice as teachers can
only assign right or wrong to each item, having little leeway to discriminate grades. Still, one
22Appendix Table B4 presents the OLS estimations. In this case, we also find no grading discrimination in
multiple-choice exams.
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could interpret these results as a threat to the internal validity of our study. It can be that
math teachers praise good handwriting and organization when grading questions that require
written answers. If these skills correlate with behaviors, our estimates would be biased, and this
could explain why the grading biases in the objective teacher-graded tests are lower. To test
this hypothesis, we re-estimate our main results using a subsample of schools where students
perform blindly-graded essays, and then adjust for the blind essay scores to check whether
this seems to be an important confounder. This kind of examination, more than any other,
should capture abilities like those mentioned before. Appendix Table B5 presents the results.
In summary, we find nearly identical grading biases when we control for the essay scores, even
if we correct its measurement error by using lagged scores. Overall, we are confident that our
main results are not biased due to writing competencies praised by math teachers in grades.
We also use the blind essay scores to test whether teachers from this subject practice
grading discrimination toward student behaviors. In this particular case, we were able to
compare exams with exactly the same format. Appendix Table B6 presents the estimated biases
in the non-blind essay scores. Unconditional results (column (1)) indicate that students with the
worst classroom behavior (as reported by their essay teachers) have disadvantages of 0.34 SD.
The well-behaved pupils have advantages of 0.36 SD. In column (2), we adjust for performance
in blindly-graded essays. The students with good (bad) in-class behavior receive grade credits
(deductions) of 0.12 SD (approximately 35% of the unconditional effects). Columns (3) and
(4) present the results when we analyze only the essays that are high-stakes. In this reduced
sample, though, we are underpowered to detect smaller effects. Hence, the BB estimate of -0.05
SD is not precisely estimated. Still, we can not reject under traditional levels of significance that
this effect is statistically different from the effect we estimate using only non-high-stakes essays
(column (5)). The GB estimate remains very similar (0.11, s.e 0.06). Overall, the estimates
presented here are quantitatively similar to those obtained when analyzing math scores, even
though here, we are comparing exams with exactly the same format, while in the mathematics’
case, non-blind exams are mostly subjective and the blind ones are objective. This is further
evidence suggesting that our results are not biased due to the potential skills required only by
one type of exam.
5.2 Do the estimated biases reflect effect of different timing of ex-
ams?
We now examine the possibility that the results mainly reflect the effect of the specific pattern
in the timing of the exams where, in most of the cases, the non-blind exam follows the blind
exam. This different timing could, in theory, account for some of the gaps in performance
between students with different behaviors in the blind and non-blind exams. For example, one
could argue that while students with worse classroom behavior tend to rest between the blind
and non-blind exams, those better behaved study. In this case, performance in the blind tests
may not reflect precisely the students’ level of proficiency at the time they take the non-blind
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tests, especially if the time gap is large.23 In our setting, the time difference between the two
exams varies across schools, typically being between 5 to 30 days (see Appendix Figure B.1).
However, the time difference varies less than ten days only for the first exams, which we can not
explore in the IV estimation. In Appendix Table B7, we explore timing heterogeneity using two
subsamples where the time difference between the blind and the non-blind exams differ from
10 to 20 days and more than 20 days. The estimated biases are very similar across these two
subsamples. Appendix Table B8 presents the OLS estimates. We then explore an additional
subsample where the time difference varies up to 9 days. Across these three subsamples, the
estimated biases have the same sign and are high in magnitude. These results suggest that the
specific pattern in the timing of the blind and non-blind exams is not the cause of the pattern
in our main results.
5.3 Behavior Measures
We now test alternative ways of using the behavior reports. Besides considering only the
behavior assessments by math teachers, we also test measures that use the assessments made by
all teachers. One could argue that these measures depend less on the subjectivity of a teacher’s
type, and hence capture better the student behaviors.24 Either way, Appendix Table B9 shows
that the point estimates obtained in this case are identical to those obtained in our primary
specification. Results also remain similar if we discard reports made by math teachers (Appendix
Table B10). The results presented so far are based on a discretization of the behavior measures.
One might be worried whether our evidence depends strongly on this transformation. Appendix
Table B11 shows this is not the case. The share of the association between behaviors and
test scores explained by grading discrimination remains the same when we use the continuous
behavior measures (31% and 21% for the BB and GB measures, respectively). Additionally, we
obtain similar results when using the overall number of good and bad assessments as regressors
(see Appendix Table B12).25 Finally, we use alternative data to test two other indicators of
student behaviors. One of them is the behavioral grades that students receive from each teacher
at the end of each semester. Although this is a subjective measure, it is based on mandatory
assessments, unlike the behavior reports made by teachers on the school’s system. The other
measure we use is restricted to a small sample of schools where students take regular courses
to improve their socio-emotional abilities. In these courses, students are assessed by teachers
based on in-class examinations. We standardize the grades from these exams, and use it as a
measure of non-cognitive skills. These last results are discussed in Appendix Section C.4. In
summary, they are qualitatively similar to those estimated using the behavior reports.
23One could imagine several other mechanisms. Some, however, would not explain our results. For example,
if students with worse classroom behavior tend to study for the exam later than well-behaved pupils, perhaps
because they have a higher discount rate as suggested by the literature, than they might be better prepared for
the second exam than for the first.
24In addition, as there are less missing data on behaviors when using the reports made by all teachers, we can
show that our results are valid in a larger sample of students.
25We actually use the inverse hyperbolic sine of the behavior assessments.
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5.4 Simultaneity
One might be worried about potential feedback effects between biased grades and classroom
behavior. It might be, for example, that after receiving downward biased grades, students get
mad at their teachers and start misbehaving in the classroom. To deal with that concern, we
adopt two strategies. First, we estimate the biases in the non-blind math scores from the second
semester, using only the behavior reports from the first (Appendix Table B13). The estimates
are remarkably similar to our primary results. Second, we create measures that use only behavior
reports that preceded the teacher-graded examinations.26 Appendix Table B14 presents the
results. In comparison to the grading discrimination estimated using the behavior measures
that use the assessments from the whole year – column (2) – the BB estimate remains the same,
while the GB estimate falls slightly – column (4). The conclusions, however, remain the same.
Approximately 25% of the unconditional correlation between behaviors and teacher-assigned
scores (column (3)) seem to be explained by teacher biases.
6 Potential Mechanisms
In this section, we propose and test empirically potential explanations for the teachers’ grading
behavior based on possible interpretations of statistical discrimination models.
6.1 Learning across the school-year
We start exploring predictions of models of statistical discrimination and employer learning
(Altonji and Pierret, 2001). In the employer-learning model, employers observe workers’ perfor-
mance on the job and thus learn about workers’ unobserved productivity. As they learn, they
rely less on easily observed workers’ characteristics to predict their productivity. The faster
employers learn, the shorter the period during which firms statistically discriminate.27 In our
setting, under statistical discrimination, the more teachers observe their students’ performance
at school, the less they should use classroom behaviors to predict students’ proficiency.28
Exploring the fact that we observe teachers grading six exams, we test whether estimated
biases decay throughout the year. In practice, we compare the estimated biases in the first,
second, and third exams from the second semester with its respective exams from the first
semester. If statistical discrimination is at play, and there is some learning, we should expect
lower effects in the second semester. When lagged blind scores are used as instrument for the
current scores, we lose information from the first exam from the first semester. Then, Appendix
26The drawback of using these measures is that we lost many observations, mainly for the first exams, since
among the teachers evaluating their pupils’ behavior, not all have done so since the beginning of the school-year.
27For a test of learning in this context, see Lange (2007). He shows that employers learn quickly. Initial
expectation errors decline by 50% within 3 years.
28In the context of racial grading discrimination, Botelho et al. (2015) find that while there is a bias toward
black students attending classes with a teacher for the first time, no significant disparities are found among those
that have already had classroom with that teacher before.
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Figure 4 presents the results from the second and third exams only. The point estimates are
remarkably stable across the semesters. Figure B.2 presents the results from OLS estimations,
where we can also analyze the first exams. The estimates are also very similar across the
semesters.29 These evidence suggest that a model of statistical discrimination with learning does
not seem to be explaining our results, perhaps because teachers do not statistically discriminate,
or because learning is slow in our setting.
6.2 Biases when badly-behaved students are skilled in math
Statistical discrimination arises if teachers use classroom behavior to predict students’ unobserved
ability based on beliefs they have on the proficiency of students with certain characteristics. The
question of whether such beliefs are based on real evidence or are unfounded is irrelevant to the
outcome of statistical discrimination. However, it is plausible to imagine that these beliefs may
be influenced by the superior average performance of students with better classroom behavior.
We explore heterogeneity in the performance of students in the blindly-graded examinations
to test whether the estimated biases are lower in a subsample of students where those with
worse classroom behaviors are as skilled as their classmates with better behaviors. To do so, we
select classrooms where in the first semester students with BB(pct.75) = 1 or GB(pct.75) = 0
performed, on average, better in the blind math exams than their classmates with BB(pct.75) = 0
or GB(pct.75) = 1, respectively. We call this subsample of sample A. The subsample where the
previous conditions are not satisfied is called of sample B. Appendix Figure B.3 shows that in
sample A, students with good and bad behaviors are homogeneous in terms of math proficiency
captured in the blind math scores from the first semester. In sample B, there is a striking gap
between these groups of students.
Figure 5 presents the estimated biases for the full sample, sample A, and sample B. The
estimates are similar across the samples, both when we use the behavior reports from the whole
year (panel (a)) or when we use only the behavior assessments from the first semester (panel (b)).
If anything, both the positive and the negative grading discrimination are higher within sample
A, which is the opposite of what one should expect under statistical discrimination. These
results may suggest that this form of discrimination is not explaining our results. Otherwise,
teachers are not updating their beliefs based on the average performance of the math class they
are grading.30
29Additionally, do observe that there is not much heterogeneity from the first to the second exams. The
estimates differ a lot in the third exams as in most of the schools, these exams are only multiple-choice, which
refers to our previous discussion.
30It could be, for example, that teachers think the grades from the worse-behaved students are less reliable.
Maybe, because they believe that badly-behaved pupils are more prone to cheating.
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7 Conclusion
Using a quasi-experimental design, we contrast blindly- and non-blindly- graded examinations
that cover the same content and find that teachers inflate the grades of the better-behaved
students while deducting points from the worse-behaved ones. Between 20 and 30 per cent of
the correlation between behaviors and teacher-assigned grades seem to be explained by grading
discrimination. As evidence from the literature point out that grading manipulation may
have several consequences for the students, these findings suggest that grading discrimination
is one mechanism whereby non-cognitive skills affect important life outcomes. Our results
are robust to the incidence of test score measurement error, to the way student behaviors
are measured, to potential feedback effects between behaviors and biased grades, and to the
differences between blind and non-blind examinations. We also find that theses biases are
driven by grading discrimination in written exams, where teachers can potentially be more
discretionary. Finally, we show that teachers’ grading behavior does not seem to be explained
by statistical discrimination models.
In terms of policy, our results may be important for those interested in the effects of
educational policies mediated by non-cognitive skills. As such interventions can also affect
teacher grading practices – directly affecting the importance of non-cognitive skills to test scores
– ignoring our results may lead to misleading interpretations of the results from these policies.
Our results also shed light on policies aimed at reducing grading biases. We find that biasing
grades based on student behaviors may be privately optimal from the perspective of teachers.
The rationale of this practice as a policy would be to try to induce more positive school habits,
which is essential not only for the students themselves but also for their peers. However, this
grading behavior may have pervasive consequences for the students as inaccurate grades affect
schooling and labor market outcomes. The reform known as standards-based grading emphasizes,
among other things, the explicitly use of separate reports describing student performance and
academic behaviors. The use of similar policies may reduce grading discrimination while not
encouraging misbehavior. Additionally, our findings on the grading biases in written questions
highlight the standardization in the use of partial credits as a potential mechanism to reduce
discrimination. Alternatively, new technologies – such as the use of bar codes to assure student
anonymity – can improve policy results. Evaluating the causal effects of such policies are left
for future work.
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Tables and Figures
Figure (1) Empirical CDF of the Good Behavior (GB) and Bad Behavior (BB) Measures
(a) ECDF of the BB measure – math
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(b) ECDF of the GB measure – math
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(c) ECDF of the BB measure – overall
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(d) ECDF of the GB measure – overall
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Note: This figure estimates the empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDF) of the behavior measures.
Panels a and b plot the ECDF of the bad and good behavior measures, respectively, computed using only
the assessments by math teachers. Panels c and d plot the ECDF of the bad and good behavior measures,
respectively, computed using the assessments made by all teachers.
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Figure (2) Distribution of Blind and Non-blind Math Scores
(a) Across students with different BB measures
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(b) Across students with different GB measures
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Note: These figures plot the distribution of blind math scores and non-blind math scores. Observations are at the
student×exam level. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are
at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. In panel (a), solid line represents students with
BB(Pct.75) = 1 and the dotted line represents those with BB(Pct.75) = 0. In panel (b), solid line represents
students with GB(Pct.75) = 0 and the dotted line represents those with GB(Pct.75) = 1. All test scores are
standardized (the mean equals zero and the variance equals one).
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Figure (3) Association Between the Blind and Non-blind Math Scores
Non-blind score = 0 + 0.81 x Blind score R-squared=59%
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Note: This figure plots the average of the blind and non-blind math scores across six examinations. The line
fits the data points by OLS. All test scores are standardized (the mean equals zero and the variance equals one).
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Figure (4) Heterogeneity Across Semesters and Exams - IV Estimation
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Note: This figure plots 90% confidence intervals and point estimates from student×exam-level OLS regressions of
teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, using subsamples that are specific for each exam. BB(75pct.)
and GB(75pct.) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the math
behavior measures’ distribution. All specifications follow Table 2, column 3.
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Figure (5) Estimated biases in classrooms where students with different in-class behaviors
differ (Sample B) and do not differ (Sample A) in their math proficiency
(a) Using All Behavior Reports
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Note: This figure plots 90% confidence intervals and point estimates from student×exam-level IV regressions of
teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, for different samples. Sample A selects classrooms where
in the first semester students with BB(pct.75) = 1 or GB(pct.75) = 0 performed, on average, better in the
blind math exams than their classmates with BB(pct.75) = 0 or GB(pct.75) = 1, respectively. The subsample
where the previous conditions are not satisfied is called of sample B. Full sample uses samples A and B. All
specifications follow Table 2, column (3).
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Table (1) Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Observations
Students 14,766
Schools 57
Classes 513
Grades
Grade 6 14.61% 2,157
Grade 7 15.24% 2,250
Grade 8 17.30% 2,554
Grade 9 10.40% 1,536
Grade 10 22.19% 3,276
Grade 11 20.27% 2,993
Ethnicity and Gender
Female 53.58% 7,912
White 63.36% 9,356
Pardo 16.88% 2,493
Black 2.72% 402
Other (Yellow or Indigenous) 0.63% 95
Refuse to report ethnicity 16.4% 2400
Behavior Data
Classes with at least one behavior assessment 94%
Classes with at least one behavior assessment (Math) 72.18%
Good behavior reports 15.95 22.36 13,879
Good behavior reports (Math) 4.41 7.18 10,009
Bad behavior reports 8.58 13.00 13,766
Bad behavior reports (Math) 2.87 5.19 10,184
Good behavior measure .43 .27 13,879
Good behavior measure (Math) .35 .35 10,009
Bad behavior measure .28 .27 13,766
Bad behavior measure (Math) .23 .30 10,184
Note: This table reports summary statistics for our data. Data on grades, ethnicity and gender,
and classroom behaviors are at the student-level.
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Table (2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior - IV
estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.266 -0.081 -0.076 -0.073 -0.069
(0.018)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.511 0.116 0.115 0.112 0.115
(0.021)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Blind Math Score 0.968 0.970 0.911 0.969
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.028)*** (0.067)***
Ethnicity and Gender No No Yes Yes Yes
Other Scores No No No Yes Yes
Instrumenting Language Scores - No No No Yes
High-Order Polynomials for Scores - No No No Yes
Number of Observations 44979 44979 44979 44979 44979
Number of Clusters 9462 9462 9462 9462 9462
First-stage F Statistic 5432 5303 1367 10.73
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (columns 2-5) regressions of teacher-assigned
math scores on classroom behavior. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.) stand for binary variables that indicate whether
students are at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. In the IV estimates, lagged blind
math scores are used as instrumental variable for the current math scores. All specifications include classroom
fixed effects and exams fixed effects. Other scores include the cumulative average performance in science and
humanities, and current performance in language. High-order polynomials for scores include a third order polyno-
mial for blind math scores, and an interaction term between math and language scores. In Column 5, we also use
lagged language scores as instrumental variable for the current language scores. Controls for ethnicity include 5
indicators: Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow, and White. We also include a dummy for students with missing
data on ethnicity. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the student level.
** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (3) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior - Testing
additional lags as instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV IV IV IV IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.096 -0.093 -0.094 -0.095 -0.095
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.133 0.126 0.127 0.130 0.130
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
Blind Math Score 0.801 0.868 0.855 0.827 0.833
(0.033)*** (0.040)*** (0.044)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)***
Number of Lags 1 2 3 1-2 1-3
Number of Observations 27940 27940 27940 27940 27940
Number of Clusters 9459 9459 9459 9459 9459
First-stage F Statistic 1012 766.3 619.1 804.8 649.7
Over-ID Test (p-value) 0.185 0.355
Note: This table reports student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom
behavior. Specifications follow Table 2, column (3), except for the instrumental variable. This table tests as
instrumental variable the first, second, and third lags of the math blind scores separately (columns 1-3) and
jointly (columns 4-5). The sample is restricted to observations from the second semester as we need at least
three past exams when using the third lag of the blind scores as instrumental variable. Columns 4-5 present
p-values for over-identification tests.
** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (4) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior - OLS
estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
BB (Pct. 75) -0.261 -0.180 -0.185 -0.104 -0.099
(0.018)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.506 0.332 0.333 0.197 0.171
(0.021)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
Blind Math Score 0.426 0.424 0.234 0.186
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Ethnicity and Gender No No Yes Yes Yes
Other Scores No No No Yes Yes
Past Math Scores No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 46787 46787 46787 46787 46787
Number of Clusters 9462 9462 9462 9462 9462
Adjusted R-squared 0.0534 0.226 0.228 0.330 0.353
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom
behavior. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the
top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. Other scores include the cumulative average
performance in science and humanities, and current performance in language. Past math scores include the
lagged blind math score. Controls for ethnicity include 5 indicators: Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow, and
White. We also include a dummy for students with missing data on ethnicity. Standard errors in parenthesis
are robust and clustered at the student level.
** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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A OLS and IV Potential Biases
We consider a simple econometric model to analyze the bias of the OLS if the blind test score is
measured with error, and of the IV estimator when the exogeneity assumption of the instrument
does not hold. For simplicity, we assume that all variables have expected value equal to zero,
we consider only the measure of good behavior, and we suppress the ijs sub-index. A simplified
version of equation 1 is then given by
SNB = βGB + δSB + ε, (2)
where ε = ξ + r− δu+ v. We assume that E[GBε] = 0, but E[SBε] is potentially different from
zero. Following the discussion from Section 3, we consider the case in which r ≈ 0, so that
E[SBε] 6= 0 because of the measurement error u. We also assume that ξ is uncorrelated with
GB and SB.
Assuming that u is uncorrelated with all other variables in the model, we have that the
OLS estimator is such that

 βˆ
ols
δˆols

→p

 β
δ

+ 1
σ2xσ
2
w − (σxw)
2

 σxwσ
2
uδ
−σ2xσ
2
uδ

 ,
where σ2x = var(GB), σ
2
w = var(S
B), σ2u = var(u), and σxw = cov(GB,S
B). If we define the
linear projection GB = γSB+h, then γ = σxw
σ2
w
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[
1− γ2 σ
2
w
σ2
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]
> 0,
so the sign of the bias of the OLS estimator for β is determined by the signs of σxw and δ.
Given model 1, we have that δ > 0. Moreover, we can estimate σxw using the data, where we
find σˆxw > 0. Therefore, we should expect that βˆ
ols is upward biased. The intuition is that the
measurement error u implies that the estimator for δ will suffer from attenuation bias, which
implies that it will not completely control for students’ skills. If we consider instead our measure
of bad behavior, then the correlation between BB and SB is negative, which implies that the
estimator associated with BB would be downward biased.
We consider next estimation of equation 2 using lagged blind test score LSB as instrumental
variable for SB. This instrument clearly satisfies the relevance condition. If E[LSBε] = 0, then
the IV estimator would be consistent for β. We are worried, however, that the exogeneity
condition for the instrument may not be valid. We assume that E[LSBu] ≈ 0, which is a
standard assumption in classical test theory and applied papers (e.g., Bond and Lang (2018)).
In section 4, we present evidence that gives some support on the validity of the assumption.
Still, it may be that E[LSBξ] > 0. For example, teachers may statistically discriminate students
based on their past performance in blind scores or other correlated unobservable signals of
scholastic ability. In this case, we have that the IV estimator will converge to

 βˆ
IV
δˆIV

→p

 β
δ

+ 1
σ2xσwz − σxwσxz

 −σxwE[LS
Bε]
σ2xE[LS
Bε],

 ,
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where σwz = cov(LS
B, SB) and σxz = cov(LS
B, GB). Note that σ2xσwz − σxwσxz = cov(e1, e2),
where e1 is the population error in the linear projection of GB on S
B, and e2 is the population
error in the linear projection of GB on LSB. If we consider the residuals from a regression of
GB on SB and the residuals from a regression of GB on LSB, then the correlation between
these two residuals is positive, which provides evidence that σ2xσwz − σxwσxz is positive. Given
that σxw > 0 when we consider a measure of good behavior, if we have E[LS
Bu] ≈ 0 and
E[LSBξ] > 0, then βˆIV would be downward biased. Likewise, if we consider a measure of bad
behavior, then the estimator associated with this variable would be upward biased.
Combining these results, we have that the discrimination parameters are bounded by the
OLS and the IV estimators.
B Additional Tables and Figures
Figure (B.1) Density of the timing differences between the blind and the non-blind exams
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Note: This figure estimates the density of the timing differences between the blind and non-blind math exams,
when we pool all the six exams.
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Figure (B.2) Heterogeneity Across Semesters and Exams - OLS Estimation
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Note: This figure plots 90% confidence intervals and point estimates from student×exam-level OLS regressions of
teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, using subsamples that are specific for each exam. BB(75pct.)
and GB(75pct.) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the math
behavior measures’ distribution. All specifications follow Table 4, column 5.
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Figure (B.3) Distribution of Blind and Non-blind Math Scores from the 1st Semester
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Note: These figures estimate the density of the blind math scores from the first-semester exams for students whose
behavior indicators assume different values, using two different samples. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.) stand for
binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution.
In the top two figures, solid line represents students with BB(Pct.75) = 1 and the dotted line represents those
with BB(Pct.75) = 0. In the bottom two figures, solid line represents students with GB(Pct.75) = 0 and the
dotted line represents those with GB(Pct.75) = 1. Sample A selects classrooms where in the first semester
students with BB(pct.75) = 1 or GB(pct.75) = 0 performed, on average, better in the blind math exams than
their classmates with BB(pct.75) = 0 or GB(pct.75) = 1, respectively. We call this subsample of sample A. The
subsample where the previous conditions are not satisfied is called of sample B.
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Table (B1) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – school-
level cluster
(1) (2)
OLS IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.266 -0.073
(0.019)*** (0.012)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.511 0.112
(0.029)*** (0.017)***
Blind Math Score 0.911
(0.035)***
Number of Observations 44979 44979
Number of Clusters 51 51
First-stage F Statistic 525.2
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. Column 2 follows the same specifica-
tion from Table 2, column 3, except for the standard errors
that here are calculated with school-level clusters.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – re-
stricting δ = 1
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
BB (Pct. 75) -0.075 -0.070 -0.069
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.103 0.103 0.101
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Ethnicity and Gender No Yes Yes
Other Scores No No Yes
Number of Observations 44979 44979 44979
Number of Clusters 9462 9462 9462
Note: This table reports student×exam-level regressions of the difference
between non-blind and blind math scores on classroom behavior. All
test scores are standardized. All specifications include classroom fixed
effects and exams fixed effects. Other scores include the cumulative aver-
age performance in science and humanities, and current performance in
language. Controls for ethnicity include 5 indicators: Black, Indigenous,
Pardo, Yellow, and White. We also include a dummy for students with
missing data on ethnicity. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and
clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B3) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior by
question type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.170 0.016 -0.330 -0.132
(0.020)*** (0.021) (0.021)*** (0.017)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.405 0.058 0.578 0.145
(0.024)*** (0.023)** (0.023)*** (0.019)***
Blind Math Score 0.908 0.923
(0.048)*** (0.034)***
Type of questions Multiple-choice Multiple-choice Written Written
Number of Observations 17701 17701 27278 27278
Number of Clusters 9282 9282 9457 9457
First-stage F Statistic 582.4 1081
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (columns 1 and 3) and IV (columns 2 and 4) regres-
sions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, for two different subsamples. One of them
is restricted to non-blind exams that are only multiple-choice, and the other to non-blind exams that
require written answers. Columns 2 and 4 follow the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B4) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior by
question type – OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
BB (Pct. 75) -0.162 -0.020 -0.326 -0.152
(0.020)*** (0.017) (0.021)*** (0.015)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.399 0.100 0.576 0.213
(0.023)*** (0.019)*** (0.023)*** (0.016)***
Type of questions Multiple-choice Multiple-choice Written Written
Number of Observations 18463 18463 28324 28324
Number of Clusters 9335 9335 9462 9462
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on class-
room behavior, for two different subsamples. One of them is restricted to non-blind exams that are only
multiple-choice, and the other to non-blind exams that require written answers. Columns 2 and 4 follow
the same specification from Table 4, column 5.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B5) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – adjusting
for blind essay scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.321 -0.133 -0.126 -0.109
(0.022)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.568 0.129 0.126 0.121
(0.024)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
Blind Math Score 0.934 0.923 0.896
(0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)***
Essay Scores No No Yes Yes
Instrumenting Essay Scores - - No Yes
Number of Observations 23177 23177 23177 23177
Number of Clusters 8739 8739 8739 8739
First-stage F Statistic 912.4 903.4 320.6
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (columns 2-3) regressions
of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, in a subsample where essay scores are
available. Column 2 follows the same specification from Table 2, column 3. Column 3 addi-
tionally controls for blind essay scores, and column 4 uses lagged essay scores as instrumental
variable for the current ones.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B6) Estimated biases in the non-blind essay scores toward classroom behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV OLS IV Low−High
BB (Pct. 75) -0.341 -0.125 -0.248 -0.0510 0.082
(0.024)*** (0.021)*** (0.061)*** (0.053) [0.157]
GB (Pct. 75) 0.356 0.117 0.375 0.112 -0.006
(0.025)*** (0.022)*** (0.072)*** (0.058)* [0.923]
Blind Essay Scores 0.565 0.759
(0.046)*** (0.104)***
Stakes High and Low High and Low High High
Number of Observations 17792 17792 3633 3634
Number of Clusters 6257 6257 860 860
First-stage F Statistic 423.4 96.48
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (columns 1 and 3) and IV (columns 2 and 4) regressions of teacher-
assigned essay scores on classroom behavior, for two different subsamples. One of them uses all the essay exams, and
the other is restricted to essay scores that are high-stakes. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.) stand for binary variables
that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the essay behavior measures’ distribution. Columns 2 and 4
follow the same specification from Table 2, column 3. Column 5 reports the differences between the point estimates of
BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75) presented in column 4 and the point estimates associated with these behavior indicators
obtained in a subsample of only non-high-stakes exams. In brackets, p-values for t-tests under the null that theses
coefficients are equal.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B7) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – varying
the timing between the blind and non-blind exams
(1) (2)
IV IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.118 -0.148
(0.032)*** (0.033)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.136 0.117
(0.036)*** (0.038)***
Blind Math Score 1.093 0.924
(0.065)*** (0.081)***
Timing differences From 10 to 20 days More than 20 days
Number of Observations 8610 6779
Number of Clusters 4350 5050
First-stage F Statistic 338.3 205.4
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (columns 2-5)
regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, for two different
subsamples according due to timing differences between the realization of the blind
and non-blind exams. Column 1 uses exams where this difference varies from 10 to
20 days; Column 2, more than 20 days. All columns follow the same specification
from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B8) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – varying
the timing between the blind and non-blind exams (OLS estimation)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
BB (Pct. 75) -0.112 -0.172 -0.129
(0.039)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.195 0.213 0.179
(0.044)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)***
Timing differences From 0 to 9 days From 10 to 20 days More than 20 days
Number of Observations 2436 8610 6779
Number of Clusters 2436 4350 5050
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom
behavior, for three different subsamples according due to timing differences between the realization of the
blind and non-blind exams. Column 1 uses exams in which this difference varies up to 9 days; Column 2,
from 10 to 20 days; Column 3, more than 20 days. All columns follow the same specification from Table 4,
column 5.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B9) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
all the behavior assessments
(1) (2)
OLS IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.240 -0.076
(0.015)*** (0.011)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.524 0.110
(0.016)*** (0.012)***
Blind Math Score 0.870
(0.022)***
Number of Observations 67495 67495
Number of Clusters 13654 13654
First-stage F Statistic 2194
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.) stand for
binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top
quartile of the behavior measures’ distribution, computed us-
ing the behavior assessments made by all teachers. Column 2
follows the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B10) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
all the behavior assessments, expect those by math teachers
(1) (2)
OLS IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.245 -0.073
(0.015)*** (0.011)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.483 0.102
(0.017)*** (0.012)***
Blind Math Score 0.879
(0.022)***
Number of Observations 65593 65593
Number of Clusters 13271 13271
First-stage F Statistic 2163
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.) stand for
binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top
quartile of the behavior measures’ distribution, computed us-
ing the behavior assessments made by all teachers, except those
made by math teachers. Column 2 follows the same specifica-
tion from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B11) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
the continuous behavior measures
(1) (2)
OLS IV
BB -0.357 -0.104
(0.029)*** (0.021)***
GB 0.789 0.177
(0.031)*** (0.022)***
Blind Math Score 0.906
(0.028)***
Number of Observations 44979 44979
Number of Clusters 9462 9462
First-stage F Statistic 1356
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. BB and GB stand for the math be-
havior measures. Column 2 follows the same specification from
Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B12) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
the number of behavior assessments
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Ln BB Reports -0.145 -0.052
(0.012)*** (0.008)***
Ln GB Reports 0.320 0.074
(0.014)*** (0.011)***
Blind Math Score 0.873
(0.026)***
Number of Observations 46757 46787
Number of Clusters 9462 9462
First-stage F Statistic 1532
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. Ln BB reports and Ln GB reports
stand for the natural logarithm of the number of bad and good
behavior assessments received by math teachers plus 1. Col-
umn 2 follows the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B13) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores from the 2nd semester towards
classroom behavior – using behavior reports from the 1st semester
(1) (2)
OLS IV
BB (Pct. 75) (1st Semester) -0.253 -0.070
(0.019)*** (0.014)***
GB (Pct. 75) (1st Semester) 0.488 0.103
(0.022)*** (0.016)***
Blind Math Score 0.914
(0.029)***
Number of Observations 40907 40907
Number of Clusters 8598 8598
First-stage F Statistic 1292
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and
IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on class-
room behavior, for a subsample of exams from the second semester
only. BB(75pct.) (1st Semester) and GB(75pct.) (1st Semester)
stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the
top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution, computed
using only behavior assessments from the first semester. Column 2
follows the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B14) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
pre-exam behavior reports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
BB -0.398 -0.118
(0.037)*** (0.027)***
GB 0.811 0.213
(0.038)*** (0.027)***
BB (Pre-exams) -0.386 -0.108
(0.033)*** (0.025)***
GB (Pre-exams) 0.728 0.182
(0.033)*** (0.026)***
Blind Math Score 0.859 0.862
(0.032)*** (0.033)***
Number of Observations 27303 27303 27303 27303
Number of Clusters 7296 7296 7296 7296
First-stage F Statistic 945.3 942.9
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (columns 1 and 3) and IV (columns 2 and
4) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior. BB (Pre − exams)
and GB (Pre− exams) are the math behavior measures, computed using only assessments
that preceded each examination. Columns 2 and 4 follow the same specification from Table 2,
column 3. Columns 1 and 2 replicate Appendix Table B11, using a subsample of observations
where the behavior measures that use pre-exam reports are not missing.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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C Additional Heterogeneities and Robustness Checks
C.1 Racial and Gender Discrimination
Table C1 presents the estimated bias in the non-blind math scores toward black pupils. Blacks’
average non-blind scores are 0.20 SD below than whites’ (column (1)). This gap falls drastically
(-0.03, s.e. 0.03) when we adjust for student proficiency captured by blind scores. Although
not precisely estimated, this point estimate is similar to the obtained by Botelho et al. (2015)
(-0.02, s.e. 0.005), which also analyze Brazilian students, though in a very different context. In
their study, 18% of the students are black. In ours, only 3%. A major difference is that we are
analyzing private schools, while they are studying public schools. This fact, associated with
the income gap between black and white people in Brazil, probably explains the lower share
of black students in our sample. They also evaluate a higher number of students, which allow
them to precisely estimate discrimination effects of -0.02 SD. Assuming this is the true effect,
considering our s.e. of 0.036, and fixing a 10% level test, our power is only 14%.
In Table C2 we present the estimated grading bias toward gender. Boys have advantages of
0.04 SD over girls in math test scores. This could indicate some favoritism toward boys. However,
by controlling for non-blind math grades we find evidence that boys’ math proficiency is under-
assessed by teachers. The grading bias is equivalent to a taxation of 0.04 SD in non-blind scores.
Our main estimate drops slightly when we control for student in-class behaviors, reflecting
a small correlation between these non-cognitive skills and gender, but remains statistically
different from zero. These findings are in line with several studies from the literature (e.g., Lavy
(2008); Falch and Naper (2013)).
Taken together, our results indicate that despite suggestive evidence of biases toward boys
and black students, results are much lower in comparison to discrimination toward behavior.
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Table (C1) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores against black pupils
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Black -0.205 -0.036 -0.040
(0.051)*** (0.034) (0.034)
Blind Math Score 0.974 0.946
(0.012)*** (0.012)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.081
(0.013)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.121
(0.015)***
Number of Observations 46974 46975 46975
Number of Clusters 9500 9500 9500
First-stage F Statistic 6351 5772
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (column
2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on ethnicity. Black stands for a
binary variable that indicates whether student is black. We also control for
a binary variable that indicates whether student is Pardo, and for a binary
variable that indicates whether student is yellow, indigenous or has missing
data on ethnicity. The omitted category is white. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.)
stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quar-
tile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. In the IV estimates, lagged
blind math scores are used as instrumental variable for the current math scores.
Columns 2-3 also controls for past blind scores of language, science, and human-
ities. All specifications include classroom fixed effects and exams fixed effects.
Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (C2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores against boys
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Boy 0.038 -0.040 -0.027
(0.016)** (0.011)*** (0.011)**
BB (Pct. 75) -0.077
(0.014)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.119
(0.015)***
Blind Math Score 0.977 0.949
(0.012)*** (0.012)***
Number of Observations 46974 46975 46975
Number of Clusters 9500 9500 9500
First-stage F Statistic 6394 5788
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (col-
umn 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on gender. BB(75pct.)
and GB(75pct.) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students
are at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. In the
IV estimates, lagged blind math scores are used as instrumental variable for
the current math scores. Columns 2-3 also control for past blind scores of
language, science, and humanities. All specifications include classroom fixed
effects and exams fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust
and clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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C.2 What are the behaviors driving the results?
Here we estimate heterogeneous effects for each of the behaviors. To do so, we calculate
disaggregated behavior measures. Take the behavior report “Dedication” as an example. Let
dis indicate the number of assessments i received under this category by a subject s teacher.
The measure Dedicationis is then defined as:
Dedicationis :=
dis
max{djs : j ∈ C(i)}
.
Figure C.1 presents our main estimates. In panel (a), we estimate the grading biases
toward each of the behaviors separately. Overall, the point estimates are similar, indicating that
they are all capturing correlated biases. Notice that in this case, the point estimates capture
both positive and negative discrimination. In panel (b), we estimate the effects using the same
regression model. The negative discrimination is driven by the disinterest of the students during
the class (-0.10, s.e. 0.2) and is followed by ‘Did not complete the required tasks’ (-0.04, s.e.
0.2). Conditioning on all the disaggregated behavior measures, cellphone use and excessive
talk do not seem to be factored by teachers in grades. The positive discrimination is driven by
dedication (0.15, s.e. 0.2), and is followed by participation during the class (0.06, s.e. 0.2). Point
estimate associated with good interaction with classmates is positive, though not statistically
different from zero (0.2, s.e. 0.2).
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Figure (C.1) Estimated biases toward each behavior
(a) Different regressions
Cellphone Use
Excessive Talking
Disinterest in the class
Didn't complete required tasks
Good Interaction with classmates
Dedication
Participation during the class
-.3 -.25 -.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
Estimated Bias
(b) Same regression
Cellphone Use
Excessive Talking
Disinterest in the class
Didn't complete required tasks
Good Interaction with classmates
Dedication
Participation during the class
-.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Estimated Bias
Note: These figures plots student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on measures for
each classroom behavior. Panel (a) plots point estimates from different IV regressions on each behavior. Panel
(b) plots point estimates from an IV regression on all the behaviors. Both also plots 90% confidence intervals.
All regressions follow the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
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C.3 Biases in the Portuguese non-blind scores
Table (C3) Estimated biases in the non-blind Portuguese scores toward classroom behavior
(1) (2)
OLS IV
BB (Pct. 75) -0.259 -0.058
(0.021)*** (0.016)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.406 0.088
(0.024)*** (0.017)***
Blind Portuguese Score 0.832
(0.046)***
Number of Observations 31042 31042
Number of Clusters 6525 6525
First-stage F Statistic 585.6
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned Portuguese
scores on classroom behavior. BB(75pct.) and GB(75pct.)
stand for binary variables that indicates whether students are
at the top quartile of the Portuguese behavior measures’ dis-
tribution. Column 2 follows the same specification from Table
2, column 3.
** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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C.4 Alternative behavior measures
We start showing the results we obtain using the behavioral grades students receive at the
end of each semester. Table C4 shows that students at the top of the math behavioral grades’
distribution perform 0.54 points higher than others in non-blind math tests (column (1)). The
point estimate drops significantly when we control for the blind scores, but remain statistically
significant and high in magnitude (0.14, s.e 0.01). This amounts to 25% of the unconditional
gaps. It is also equivalent to an increase of 0.18 of one SD in blind math scores. Figure C.2
presents the results when we use the standardized scores as regressors. In addition, we show
that the results are similar if instead of using the math grades, we use the average grade from all
subjects. For both cases, we also show that estimating the biases in the non-blind scores from
the second semester, while using the behavioral grades from the first, leads to similar results.
We now use the pupils’ grades in the courses aimed at increasing their non-cognitive skills.
Table C5 shows that the average math grade of students in the top quartile of the non-cognitive
scores’ distribution is 0.46 SD above the others (column (1)). We also find statistically significant
results after controlling for student proficiency proxied by blind scores: 0.06 SD or 12% of the
unconditional gap (column (2)). Table C6 shows that the results are similar when we use the
continuous socio-emotional grades and slightly smaller we use only scores that precede the math
examinations.
Table (C4) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior (using
behavioral grades)
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Behavior Score (Pct.75) 0.547 0.142
(0.019)*** (0.016)***
Blind Math Score 0.750
(0.030)***
Number of Observations 35701 35701
Number of Clusters 11948 11948
First-stage F Statistic 1212
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column
1) and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math
scores on classroom behavior, measured by behavioral grades.
Behavior Score (75pct.) stands for a binary variable that in-
dicates whether students are at the top quartile of the math
behavioral grade. Column 2 follows the same specification
from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Figure (C.2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward in-class behaviors – using
the behavioral grades
Math
All Subjects
Math (Past Semester)
All Subjects (Past Semester)
0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1
Estimated Bias
Note: This figure plots 90% confidence intervals and point estimates from student×exam-level IV regressions of
teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, measured by behavioral grades. Math indicates the average
of the math grades through the year; All Subjects stands for the average of the grades from all subjects through
the year; Math (Past Semester) indicates the first-semester math grades; and All Subjects (Past Semester) stands
for the average of the first-semester grades from all subjects. In these last two cases, biases toward classroom
behavior are estimated using only the teacher-assigned math scores from the second semester.
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Table (C5) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
the socio-emotional scores
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Socio-emotional Score (Pct. 75) 0.466 0.057
(0.042)*** (0.026)**
Blind Math Score 0.893
(0.054)***
Number of Observations 9055 9055
Number of Clusters 1834 1834
First-stage F Statistic 341.5
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV
(column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom
behavior, measured by grades from a non-cognitive skills course. Sotio-
emotional Score (75pct.) stands for a binary variable that indicates
whether students are at the top quartile of the grades from regular
courses designed to improve sotio-emotional skills. Column 2 follows
the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Table (C6) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
the continuous socio-emotional scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS OV
Socio-emotional Score 0.345 0.067
(0.023)*** (0.016)***
Socio-emotional Score (Pre Exams) 0.296 0.051
(0.021)*** (0.015)***
Blind Math Score 0.890 0.892
(0.054)*** (0.054)***
Number of Observations 9055 9055 9055 9055
Number of Clusters 1834 1834 1834 1834
First-stage F Statistic 341.2 342
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-
assigned math scores on classroom behavior, measured by grades from a non-cognitive skills course. Socio-
emotional Score stands for the average of the standardized scores that comes from grades in these courses.
Socio-emotional Score (Pre Exams) stands for the cumulative average of these scores. Column 2 follows
the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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